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ABSTRACT
Theexisting political and legal institutions of fiscal
policy-making are under challenge. As the United States and the
eastern European and Soviet states experiment with policy
decentralization, the states of western Europe are looking to a
more centralized policy structure via the E.E.C.. This paper
seeks to raise issues of importance to all such reform
efforts--notably, the need to consider, and balance, the
inefficiencies of fiscal policy decentralization (spillovers and
wasteful fiscal competition) against the inefficiencies of fiscal
policy centralization (policy cycles and localized 'pork barrel'
spending and taxes). The need to develop new fiscal policy
institutions emphasizing voluntary agreements and responsive
'agenda-setters' is stressed.
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In democratic and totalitarian regimes alike, the existing political and legal
institutions of economic policy-making are under challenge. The wisdom of centralized
fiscal regimes is now being questioned: quietly under the banner of the "new federalism"
in the United States and vocally, if not violently, through the secessionist movements of
eastern Europe and the Soviet states. As these nations experiment with decentralized
fiscal institutions, the countries of western Europe are now looking to the potential of a
more centralized economic order within the new European Economic Community. This
paper seeks to raise issues of importance to all such reform efforts and, within that
context, to offer some cautionary advise for the design of E.E.C. fiscal institutions based
upon the recent American experience with centralized fiscal policy-making.
II.The Role for Central Government Fiscal Policies in Economic Unions
The European Community's progress towards an economic and monetary union
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California, Berkeley.based upon a common currency will create new demands for the design of fiscal policy.3
Perhaps most importantly, with a common currency and thus a common monetary policy,
member states will no longer be able to influence their local economies through exchange
rate or monetary policies when state-specific economic shocks occur.4 State-specific
fiscal policies stand as an alternative. Three questions arise: 1) Can member state fiscal
policies be effective in offsetting local economic shocks in an integrated economic union;
2) If effective, are such policies likely to be optimally managed at the state level; and 3)
If ineffective or non-optimal, what central government policies might be then preferred?
The recent United States experience is instructive on each point.
Can member state fiscal policies be effective? In open, integrated economies,
deficit financed demand creation may be of only limited usefulness to small member
states. First, the demand stimulus of deficit financing is dissipated through import
demands from other union states. Gramlich (1987) has shown that the effectiveness of
deficit policies in the smallest U.S. states is significantly import constrained, though
larger states may be able to use own deficits to affect state employment prospects.
Second, in member states the use of such deficits to combat local shocks may be
significantly limited by what the capital markets will allow.While deficits may be
See Eichengreen (1990).
There is growing evidence of the economic importance of state-specific economic
shocks to the short-run and long-run prospects of states and regions in integrated
economic unions; see Bernard and Durlauf (1991) for a study of OECD countries many
of which are in the EEC. and Brown, Coulson, and Engle (1990) for a study of U.S.
states. Member States which manage these shocks well are likely to enjoy higher long-run
growth.beneficial to the local economy during downturns and while member states may promise
to repay those deficits with surpluses during the upswing, such promises are difficult to
enforce. The U.S. capital market has appeared reluctant to accept a state's promise of
a balanced budget over a business cycle; such promises lack credibility when temporary
economic downturns are not easily distinguished from long-run structural declines. When
"good" deficits cannot be distinguished from "bad", the only credible local government
promise may be a balanced budget in each fiscal year. The stringent U.S. state budgets
for the recessionary 1992 fiscal year--balanced through major tax increases and deep
spending cuts—offer evidence on the point.5
Even.if member state deficit policies are economically feasible, their management
may be non-optimal. In interdependent economic unions, the benefits from local demand
creation through deficit financing may spillover to other member states via import
expansion, while the interest costs of deficits remain with the borrowing state. The result
will be an under-provision of expansionary fiscal policies by member states, using the
arguments of Hart (1982).' Central government fiscal policies stand as the policy
alternative.
A few states have responded to this lack of capital market credits during
recessionary periods by creating their own "rainy day" funds during good years and
depleting those funds during economic downturns. In effect, they are borrowing from
their own taxpayers. Unfortunately, these funds were insufficient to prevent the harsh
fiscal choices of this current recession, suggesting that taxpayers--particularly if they are
mobile--may be reluctant lenders too.
The simulations of Gramlich (1987, Table 1) also show that as benefit spillovers
increase with greater import substitution and as the local Costs of borrowing rise, U.S.
states have significantly reduced incentives to use local fiscal policies to manage
economic downturns.
3The United States policy response to the problems of localized economic shocks
has been the implementation of an experience-rated, unemployment insurance program
for member states. States are required to make contributions to a central insurance fund
based upon their employment histories and are allowed to withdraw from the fund for
benefit payments during recessionary periods. Experience-rating and centrally constrained
benefits help to control problems of moral hazard while experience-rating and mandatory
participation eliminate the problem of adverse selection. Uncorrelated, local economic
shocks are well managed by such an insurance mechanism.7
Central government fiscal policies will also be needed to finance (and perhaps
provide) those public goods with significant externalities member states.
Environmental policies, collective military defenses, and redistributive concerns by
citizens for residents of member states other than their own are possible examples.
Voluntary agreements between member states for the provision of these goods are
possible, but at a minimum, a central government administrative structure will be needed
to enforce the arrangements. While the new analysis of the voluntary provision of public
goods suggests that such agreements may well provide some positive levels of the public
good, efficient provision should not be expected. Central government public goods
provision--not just administration--may be desirable; NATO is has recently been shown
Common economic shocks are not, however. Fortunately, common shocks
affecting all member states can be managed by the new central government's monetary
authority.
See Comes and SandIer (1986, chapter 5).
4to be one example of voluntary, but inefficient, provision of an extensive public good.9
Central government fiscal policies to complement member stales' own fiscal
policies also may be needed when labor and capital are freely mobile across state lines,
as for example, in the U.S. and the proposed E.E.C.. First, while the free mobility of
labor across the members of an economic union will enhance efficiency in pure private
goods economies, this conclusion does not necessarily follow in economies with private
goods and locally provided public goods. Local public goods benefit all residents
(whether citizens or not) but non-residents do not benefit. Examples include clean and
safe environments, public health, or educated co-workers.
Recent research on such economies, summarized by the Henry George Theorem,
has shown that the efficient financing of such local public goods by the member states
requires the full (100%) taxation of the returns to the immobile resources within the
state, for example, taxes on locally owned land rents or the profits from natural resource
activities. Any tax rate less than 100% implies existing residents share the rents and
profits with new residents creating an incentive for workers to locate according to their
average, not marginal, products.'°
If mobile labor imposes a congestion cost on existing residents--for example if the
See Sandier and Murdoch (1990).
'°SeeWildasin (1986, sections 2.2 and 2.3) for a full discussion. The case here of
pure public goods financed by a 100% tax on land rents and locationally specific (e.g.,
natural resource) profits corresponds to Wildasin's case 2 (1986. p. 15). As noted by
Roadway and Flatters (1982, p. 621) this locational inefficiency also can be eliminated
if all rents and profits are capitalized into land values, and land is required for residency.
In this case new residents will not share in local rents and profits.
5local public good is now impure--then an additional head tax on new residents equal
to their marginal congestion cost imposed on existing residents must be levied." If, in
the limit, marginal congestion costs per resident rise to just equal the average cost per
resident of providing the local public good, then a head tax alone will be sufficient to
finance the public service. This limiting case corresponds to the famous Tiebout Theorem
for the efficient provision of local public goods; in this ideal world, there will be no need
for central government intervention.'2
Inefficiencies arise in economies with local public goods when the full taxation
of local economic rents and profits and new resident congestion is difficult to implement,
either because of informational asymmetries or local distributional politics.
Alternatively, local wage taxes, head taxes unrelated to congestion, taxes on mobile
capital, or taxes on consumption and exports will typically produce inefficient resource
allocations. Often central government fiscal policy can improve resource allocations.
In the case of inefficient taxes on mobile labor, central government grants-in-aid
which transfer resources from member states enjoying large shared rents and fiscal
'Thiscase corresponds to Wildasin's case 5(1986,p. 17).
12SeeBewley (1981). In this full congestion case of the Tiebout Theorem, the local
head tax not only fully finances local public service provision, but it also serves as an
exclusion device for new residents. It is this exclusion property of the local tax which
insures preference revelation, and thus guarantees the efficient level of local public goods
with mobile residents.
It should be noted that the Henry George Theorem does not include such a
preference revelation mechanism; the theorem only guarantees private goods efficiency,
given some exogenous level of public goods provision. With full congestion, the Tiebout
Theorem shows both private goods and public goods efficiency are possible with a fully
decentralized public goods economy.
6externalities to less advantaged member states will improve labor allocations in the
economy as a whole by encouraging workers to respond to their marginal private
products and their marginal public congestion when relocating.'3
Member state taxation of mobile capital can also be inefficient, and again central
government policy intervention can be helpful. Local, or at source, taxation of capital
either creates a tax wedge between rates of returns across member states when capital is
imperfectly mobile or no revenues at all when capital is perfectly mobile and states
compete for capital by lowering rates. The alternative strategy is to tax capital al
residencewhen its earnings are received by savers. Local resident-based capita.! taxes
may be difficult to implement, however. Such taxes require that each state government
know each resident's income from capita!, even when those capita! earnings are from
investments outside the state's taxing jurisdiction. Complicated tax treaties among
member states will be needed. Further, efforts to manage these tax treaties may create
their own inefficiencies, now on the location of financial services.'4 One appropriate
fiscal response is to tax capita! at the central government level, with proceeds allocated
to member states as lump-sum transfers.
Finally, member state taxation of local consumption or sales can be inefficient,
particularly when the taxed commodities are exported to residents in other member states.
The problem arises when one member state has within its border a locationally-fixed and
'SeeBoadway and Flatters (1982).
'SeeGiovannini (1989, pp. 364-366).
7economically unique private resource. The favored state can act as an export monopolist
by imposing a sales tax on the use of the unique private resource. The analysis extends
to two or more exporting member states, if an oligopolistic strategic equilibrium in tax
rates is established)5 All citizens of the economic union will be potentially better off
however when such state taxes on export sales are centrally prohibited)°
While the economic case for central government fiscal policies in open public
economies is clear, the prospects for their successful implementation are not. How well
do such central governments typically do in achieving the federalist policy agenda
outlined here? Again, the recent U.S. experience is instructive.
III. Fiscal Management by Central Governments: U.S. Evidence
While the new E.E.C.--and someday, perhaps, a new economic federation of
eastern European and Soviet states--has yet to specify the political institutions for
deciding union-wide fiscal policies, such institutions are clearly needed. Which political
institutions are chosen can have important implications for the efficient management of
central government fiscal policies. Two classes of democratic institutions should be
considered: those which concentrate central government fiscal authority in the hands of
a single elected agent (e.g., president or majority party leader) and those which
°SeeKoistad and Wolak's (1983) analysis of western U.S. coal producing states
where sizeable economic rents were captured through sales taxes by the exporting states.
16Potentialpareto improvements may be all that is possible, since to actually pay
compensation to the natural resource rich exporting states may violate conditions for
efficient labor mobility.
8decentralize authority among the members of a diffuse legislature (e.g., the U.S.
Congress or the European Parliament).
Fiscalpolicyin the U.S. is currently dominated by a highly decentralized
Congress, composed of 435 locally elected Representatives in the House and 100 state
elected members of the Senate. In such a legislature, deciding policies by simple
majority rule runs the risk of never ending policy cycles: policy A beats B, B beats C,
but C beats A. There is an escape from such a cycle, one that appears to be common
to many decentralized legislatures including the U.S. Congress. It is called decision-
making by a "norm of universalism, or more popularly, 'pork barrel politics." In
this environment, fiscal policies are chosen as the (literal) aggregation of locally optimal
levels of spending and taxes.
Such "universalistic" legislatures are biased towards an inefficient fiscal policy,
however. The problem is closely akin to that which arise with the shared use of a
natural resource, only here the shared resource is the central government's current and
future tax base. Under a norm of universaiism, each legislator selects a locally favored
level of central government spending and taxation balancing local benefits and costs.
Now, however, local marginal costs are equal to each member state's share of the
national tax base (e.g., 1/N, where N is the number of represented states) multiplied by
the true social marginal cost.If central government spending is for goods with
differential local benefits, then the tendency is to over-provide central government public
The formal logic of this legislative norm was first presented in Weingast (1979),
though it has been noted in the history of U.S. legislative decision-making for many
years. See Inman and Fitts (1990) for an application of this logic to fiscal policy.
9services. Inman and Fitts (1990) provide some econometric evidence that this has indeed
been the case for U.S. fiscal policies in recent years.
The incentives for inefficient spending carry over to the design of central
government tax and deficit policies as well. For example, the lack of a clear, and agreed
to, definition of capital income raises the possibility that the tax base for central
government capital taxation will be decided by the decentralized legislature seeking to
maximize local benefits to member states. Such arguably inefficient tax loopholes as oil
depletion allowances (Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana), Rand D expensing (Silicon Valley),
and accelerated depreciation (the growing South) are examples from the U.S. tax code.
Deficits too may be too large when set by inherently unstable decentralized
legislatures. Each elected representative will consider the long-run implications of his
or her fiscal choices, but only to the limit of his or her own political time horizon. If
this horizon is shorter than the societal horizon and legislative decision-making reflects
only representative preferences, then there is a bias towards excessive borrowing and
lower-than-optimal average tax rates. Roubini and Sachs (1989) found a clear tendency
towards larger deficits in OECD countries with decentralized legislatures and more
frequent government turnover.
This bias towards inefficient central government fiscal choice can be controlled,
but only through alternative political institutions. If the cause of inefficient budgeting
are the incentives inherent in decentralized legislatures, then new institutions which
centralize fiscal authority in the hands of a democratically elected agenda-setter may
be required. The two prominent examples of such centralizing institutions are an elected
10executive with budget-setting powers or a majority political party with control over the
elected legislature Inman and Fitts (1990) findevidencein the U.S. historical record
that both strong executives and strong parties have significantly reduced central
government spending and tax loopholes below that anticipated from a universalistic
legislature. The price that the individual member states must pay for this increased
efficiency in central government fiscal policy is less direct control over their own shares
of the central budget.
IV.Conclusion:Striking a Balance
There are important lessons for the nations of the E.C.C. (and eastern Europe
too) in the recent economic history of U.S. fiscal federalism. The loss of monetary
policy to a central government raises the need for a substitute fiscal policy to ease the
burdens of state specific economic shocks; centrally provided unemployment insurance
has proven to be one workable response. Central government financing and provision
of economy-wide public goods--defense, environment, redistribution--will be needed to
overcome observed free-rider behavior between member states. When state governments
provide local public goods but use inefficient tax instruments, then countervailing central
government tax treaties and grants-in-aid may be appropriate. Efforts by the economic
union to establish free trade in commodities can be undone by member states which use
local sales tax policy to exploit a monopoly position in valued exports. Again, the central
government's regulation of member state tax policies may be required. As the U.S.
experience makes clear, there is an important role for central governments in the fiscal
11affairs of economic unions.
The recent U.S. experience also emphasizes thedifficulties that central
governmentsmay have in managing their role in the federalist economy. Decentralized
legislatures with tax access to union-wide resources may mismanage those resource by
overspending, or under-taxing, for locally favored projects. More centralized political
institutions can reduce these fiscal inefficiencies, but only if member states concede
control over allocations to an agenda-setting executive or political party.
In the end, each economic union must strike a balance. Protecting the rights of
member states to control their own fiscal affairs will typically generate fiscal
inefficiencies in federalist economies, either through the direct prohibitions on central
government activities or by using decentralized legislatures to manage a more activist
agenda. Finding a balance between these competing causes of fiscal inefficiency is
central to the design of economic unions.
More important still is to look for new fiscal institutions which might reduce both
inefficiencies. Voluntary agreements between member states in decentralized public
economies and responsive agenda-setters in centralized public economies are promising
alternatives. It is here that the U.S. might hope to learn from the European experience.
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